It is another Tuesday morning in Beirut, people woke up, got dressed, and were heading to reach their jobs in downtown. Everyone was shocked at the sight of a black smoke rising from the north Beirut Souks; is it another fire? What is happening today? It has been only 6 weeks since a fire caused a terrible and huge explosion, the Beirut Port explosion that is noted to be one of the largest in history. Unfortunately, the fire’s location is also a few hundred meters away from the port. Hence, flashbacks of the horrible Beirut explosion in parallel with the huge fire hit the Lebanese people.
The word has been spread in the city. It turned out to be a fire of the beautiful piece of art by the Iraqi architect Zaha Hadid in the Aishti building under construction in the north of Beirut Souks on the 17 of September 2020. Fortunately, no one was injured. The fire was caused due to an accident in the use of a blowtorch.
The fire in the Zaha Hadid building in Beirut North Souks is another tragedy that needs to be dissected and understood in these difficult times in Lebanon. Due to the economic difficulties in Lebanon, health and safety protocols are not being followed up and given attention to for quite a long time. To understand the cause of the fire in the building, we must look at the material used, the design of the building especially where the fire originated, and how such design helped in its expansion.
Zaha Hadid was exceptionally known for her usage of beautiful and high-tech material in her structures and magnificent artworks. She used Glass- Fibre Reinforced Concrete as in the Heydar Aliyev Centre, Glass Fibre Textile as in Serpentine Sackler, and a combination of aluminium and stone cladding as in Galaxy Soho. These materials are highly flammable. Thus, some countries such as Australia started banning their use. In fact, in New South Wales, aluminium composite panels (ACPs) with a core comprised of more than 30% polyethylene (PE) by mass have been banned for use in any external cladding, external wall, external insulation, façade or rendered finish in buildings. As of August 15, 2018, the ban came into effect and has not been revoked.
A combination of aluminium and stone cladding was frequently used by the construction teams in Ms. Hadid’s designed buildings to cover the external wall of the building. It was also used in Beirut’s building structure. These are generally two thin sheets of aluminium separated by a core material. The core can be made up of PE, mineral fibre or a combination of both. It can contribute to how easily the cladding burns and to its potential to spread fire. Polyethylene is a highly combustible polymer. It becomes highly flammable at high density because of its thermoplastic composition, thus allowing the fire to expand on its surface melting the aluminium sheets and spreading the fire accordingly.
The design of the building included several layers of coating, namely from the interior to exterior: Gypsum board, limp mass barrier (sound proofing), void, rock wool, polyurethane (PU) a waterproofing material, glass and glass reinforced concrete (GRC), and fiberglass resin. The sketch and west façade figure below show how these materials where designed and executed. From the above materials listed, PU and the limp mass barrier (limp vinyl with a layer of reinforced aluminium foil facing on one side) are materials that immediately catch fire. The rest of the materials are also flammable but require elevated temperatures to ignite. The voids in the façade design creates a shaft for flames to ascend through; that is the reason behind the upward expansion of the fire.
Looking at what caused the fire, we should be aware of the section design where the fire originated. At the ground level, where the retaining wall ends, a coating of styrene-butadiene-styrene (SBS) is usually used to seal and coat the concrete retaining wall to make it water proof. This is done through heating the SBS with a blowtorch to seal and merge the different materials together. At the upward end of the retaining wall, there is a transition from the retaining wall to the façade of the building which connects the SBS to the PU. Hence, sealing the SBS above the finished floor level with a blowtorch most probably ignited the PU and causing the fire to reach the rest of the material.
Fortunately, no one was injured in the Aishti fire, however, it has spread fear and panic among a severely traumatised population. A prevention method for the expansion of such fires is introducing a complete fire zoning system. Not only from floor to floor as designed, but also an implementation in the façade. This is usually done by eliminating shafts/voids that help in flames expansion and by using fire-rated foam. Taking such measurements and including them in the design of any building is going to increase decrease the costs. There is nothing more important than the human right of living in a safe environment, hence, implementing such measures should not be debatable. In addition to that, in case of fires the financial damages would be extremely high. As a result, reducing cost on the expense of safety protocols, such as using fire-rated material and an efficient fire zoning, could be highly damaging in case of accidents.
On 14 June 2017, a similar accident took place where a fire broke out in the Grenfell Tower, in North Kensington, West London. The fire caused 72 deaths, more than 70 were injured, and 223 people managed to escape. In this accident, the fire similarly grew through the building’s exterior cladding and through the air gap which caused a similar stack effect. In conclusion, special safety protocols should be forced and implemented to guide the usage of aluminium-cladding since next time we may not be so fortunate.
Copy edited by Alissar Izrafeel
